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2 F. A. Hayek’s sympathetic agents
Sandra J. Peart and David M. Levy
Introduction
In his 2002 Nobel Lecture, Vernon Smith refers to “the simultaneous existence 
of two rational orders,” which “are distinguishing characteristics of what we are 
as social creatures” (Smith 2003: 466). For Smith, who invokes David Hume 
and F. A. Hayek in this regard, both orders “are essential to understanding and 
unifying a large body of experience from socioeconomic life and the experimen-
tal laboratory, and in charting relevant new directions for economic theory as 
well as experimental- empirical programs” (Smith 2003: 466).1 This chapter 
examines the nature and consequences of Hayek’s concept of human agency by 
exploring the Hayekian two worlds of human conduct. We argue that Hayek 
renounced the use of an explicit model of reclusive agency in favor of an implicit 
model of sympathetic (correlated) agency.
	 In	 what	 follows,	 we	 show	 first	 that,	 for	 Hayek,	 behavior	 within	 the	 small	
group – the “small band or troop,” or “micro- cosmos” – is correlated, resulting 
from agents who are sympathetic one with another. We shall argue that sym-
pathy in this context for Hayek entails the projection of one’s preferences onto 
the preferences of others. With such correlated agency as the default in small- 
group situations, Hayek attempts to explain the transition from small groups to a 
larger civilization. We consider the role of projection in Hayek’s system at 
length,	because	projection	from	the	local	group	characterized	by	a	well-	defined	
preference ordering to the world beyond the neighborhood may yield mistaken 
beliefs. We shall argue that Hayek’s recognition of this outcome underlies his 
pessimism about the democratic attempt to effect “social justice.”
 Finally, we shall take up the question of whether and how to avoid this temp-
tation to impose one set of preferences on another when local optima differ. We 
address this question by considering how sympathetic projection can go awry in 
the	Classical	tradition,	specifically	in	Adam	Smith’s	system.	The	problem	is,	we	
shall argue, one of “factions.” Smith famously worried about the destructive 
nature of factions, their tendency to exploit the larger society (Levy and Peart 
2008a). In the case of religious factions – perhaps the most famous example of 
destructive behavior of this sort – Smith held that competition among small 
groups might resolve the problem. Central to his argument is the realization that 
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if the local groups are small enough, individuals in the larger society will belong 
to overlapping organizations. As they move in their daily lives from one small 
organization	to	another,	they	will	find	that	the	organizations	differ	and	they	will	
thus learn to agree to disagree. People will come to accept the incoherence that 
characterizes life in the larger sphere.
The totalitarian temptation
A key to Hayek’s account of the totalitarian lies in the difference between 
Vernon Smith’s “two rational worlds”: an organization and an order. Hayek sets 
out the difference between an organization – a collective with a coherent set of 
goals (preference ordering) – and an order – a collective without this coherence. 
People have, he maintains, personal experience with organizations, small groups, 
but since they have none with the larger collection of organizations, orders, they 
are left to theorize about the collectivity. As they do so, as they attempt to turn 
their experience with orders into knowledge of organizations, they are tempted 
in Hayek’s account by totalitarianism. By this, Hayek means that they are 
tempted to imagine that the goals or preference ordering of the larger collective, 
the order, are coherent in the way that the goals of the small collective, the 
organization, might be. So, as people move from the small to the large group, a 
failing of the imagination occurs. People project their preference for a single 
preference ordering onto the group, and they desire the coherence that results. 
We note in what follows that, as long as the experience and consequent prefer-
ence orderings of the small groups vary, no such coherence results. More, the 
very desire for coherence on a social level is inconsistent with a liberal order 
characterized by a plurality of goals. Hayek is skeptical of any wide- scale solu-
tion to the temptation for imposing coherence, what we might call a totalitarian 
temptation, that results. The only possible solution is piecemeal institutional 
reform of one sort or another, for example, Hayek (1979), Hayek and Buchanan 
(1978).
 When Hayek wrote his Road to Serfdom, “totalitarianism” was an unfamiliar 
word. In his system, Hayek turned totalitarianism into a term with precise 
meaning.2 He distinguished between the theory of a collectivity and its manifes-
tation, totalitarianism. For Hayek, the totalitarian norm is a complete ordering of 
social states. Once we realize this, we can reformulate Hayek’s argument in 
terms of standard social choice theory. What Kenneth Arrow called a “dictator-
ship” is related to the requirements for Hayek’s “complete ethical code” of total-
itarianism.3 This totalitarian “ethical code” is characterized by a “unitary end” so 
that only one person’s goals are allowed to matter. Arrow’s impossibility 
theorem establishes that the goal of a complete ordering of social states is incon-
sistent with non- dictatorship as a formal matter.4 But Arrow leaves open the 
question of whether a collectivity might prefer coherence to non- dictatorship.5 In 
Hayek’s account, the projection motivates the temptation to choose coherence 
over non- dictatorship, so that people who are habituated to coherence in the 
small group might also prefer coherence to non- dictatorship in the large group. 
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This sheds new light on Hayek’s “slippery slope” argument, which might be 
reformulated as a recognition (and a warning against the recognition) that indi-
viduals might willingly cede freedom of choice to a dictator or a planner because 
that leaves them with the coherence that characterizes their other spheres of life.
 We shall emphasize Hayek’s treatment of the small group in writings after 
his 1960 Constitution of Liberty in which the small group is viewed as natural 
in some biological sense.6 The full measure of Hayek’s turn toward biological 
foundations is not very well understood. There is a completely non- biological 
account of the demand for coherence in his 1949 “Intellectuals and Socialism.” 
Here he distinguishes among three mutually exclusive groups – ordinary people, 
intellectuals, and specialists/scholars. Ordinary people have no use for system-
atic philosophy so they are little interested in imagining the world as coherent. 
Specialists/scholars are all too aware of the puzzles at the frontier of their dis-
cipline	 so	 they	 address	 themselves	 to	 making	 the	 pieces	 of	 their	 world	 fit	
together. Hayek’s characterization of intellectuals – “second- hand dealers in 
ideas” – although perhaps meant as an insult, makes the point quite nicely. To 
explain the world to non- specialists one is tempted to make it more coherent 
than it really is.
 Intellectual is an occupation. The imposition of coherence comes from the 
incentives of the position. Hayek’s account of the intellectuals’ demand for 
coherence	suggests	that	among	intellectuals	one	would	find	more	willingness	to	
trade democracy for coherence than in the other groups. This is certainly a testa-
ble implication. Hayek seems to have given up such incentive- based arguments 
when he started to write about small groups with unitary goals as natural. It is 
useful to note that if one distrusts such naturalistic accounts of the sort we shall 
explore next, there are incentive- based alternatives to which one might appeal.
Hayekian sympathy as correlated behavior
When we propose that Hayek works with “sympathetic” agency we need to 
clarify that his account is not necessarily the same as Adam Smith’s or, for that 
matter, pre- Smithian accounts. “Sympathy” is the transliteration of an ancient 
Greek technical term, meaning “co- affective” or “interactive.” The word was 
extensively employed by both Greek and Roman philosophers in the Stoic tradi-
tion who posited cosmic sympathy as the hidden force which moved all parts of 
the world.7 So, sympathetic explanations offered correlation without evidence of 
a causal mechanism. The correlated motion of the tides and the moon was a once 
widely used instance of how sympathy was said to play out in the physical 
world. To explain sympathetic principles of motion, the mathematical model of 
vibrating strings was developed. As sympathetic motion came to be idealized, 
“harmony” came to be understood not only as a musical term but also as an 
ethical goal (Levy and Peart 2008a).
 Adam Smith’s account of sympathy stands out as the transforming moment in 
the historical record. He took the notion of sympathy as a form of vibration that 
resulted from a physical connection and transformed it instead into an act of 
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imagination, a projection of one’s preferences to another in the same situation. 
The difference is important because, before Smith, people were said to sympa-
thize only with their equals; while Smith made the case that we can in fact sym-
pathize with those who are quite unlike ourselves. In such cases, we may initially 
make	 mistaken	 projections,	 but	 we	 come	 to	 refine	 our	 ability	 to	 sympathize.	
Affection is then nothing more than habituated sympathy (mediated by institu-
tions), and the act of sympathizing comes to equalize, to make us more alike. 
This is the key point that separated David Hume, who held that sympathy is a 
physical reaction, a form of empathy, and Smith, for whom sympathy is the pro-
jected act of imagination (Peart and Levy 2005).
 Hayek uses sympathy to explain widely observed imitative behavior.8 Imita-
tion generates correlated behavior which itself has a key methodological impli-
cation for Hayek: recognition of interpersonal dependence causes him to be 
deeply skeptical about using dependence- blind statistical methods in 
economics.9
 The correlated behavior that features most prominently in Hayek’s construc-
tion is reciprocity. In Hayek’s construction, the sense of reciprocity explains the 
movement from small groups to civilization. We quote a passage from his 
important 1966 address to the Mont Pèlerin Society. Here Hayek differentiates 
between “reciprocal but not common purposes.” He argues that the reciprocal 
behavior,	first	observed	in	a	small	tribe,	becomes	a	norm	for	“ever	wider	circles	
of undetermined persons”:10
29. The growth from the tribal organization, all of whose members served 
common purposes, to the spontaneous order of the Open Society in which 
people are allowed to pursue their own purposes in peace, may thus be said 
to	have	commenced	when	for	the	first	time	a	savage	placed	some	goods	on	
the boundary of his tribe in the hope that some member of another tribe 
would	find	 them	and	 leave	 in	 turn	behind	 some	other	goods	 to	 secure	 the	
repetition	of	the	offer.	From	the	first	establishment	of	such	a	practice	which	
served reciprocal but not common purposes, a process has been going on for 
millennia which, by making rules of conduct independent of particular pur-
poses of those concerned, made it possible to extend these rules to ever 
wider circles of undetermined persons and eventually might make possible a 
universal peaceful order of the world.
(Hayek 1966: 168)
The notion of even a small group with a common purpose might seem odd for an 
economist today, but Hayek’s appeal to what is now known as the “investment” 
or “trust” game shows just how far he is from the rational (independent) actor 
model of the 1960s. The trust game has a trivial solution, the wandering tribe 
which encounters a free lunch, picks it up and leaves nothing. The stationary 
tribe, in anticipation, leaves nothing. In point of fact, the Hayekian reciprocal 
outcome where each group leaves food for the other group(s) is borne out in 
experimental economics.11
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Hayek on projection
For Hayek, as noted above, sympathy generates imitative behavior. This is coher-
ent inside Hayek’s larger system in which he provides an alternative to accounts 
based on the assumption of independent agency. Such an alternative requires a 
theory of dependent agency. The central problem in Hayek’s theory of mind is 
classification	 or	 grouping.	The	 classification	 of	 objects	 into	 groups	 that	 are	 the	
“same” does not depend upon the objects “really” being the same. Instead, they 
are	(or	they	become)	the	“same”	because	they	are	classified	that	way.12 To move 
beyond the unconscious, Hayek depends upon projection. By an act of imagina-
tion, others become like us and so meaning becomes intersubjective.13
 We consider in order Hayek’s account of projection about other people who 
“really” are much like us and projection about those at a great distance from us. 
We will distinguish reliable from unreliable projection by appealing to the dis-
tance involved. We will return to the link between reliability and distance after 
we consider Hayek’s argument.
Reliable projection
Without distinguishing between the account in Hume and that in Smith, Hayek 
maintains that his approach is a return to the Scottish tradition.14 In either event, 
Hayek’s reformulation of the Scottish tradition rules out the “existence of isolated 
or self- contained individuals” and presupposes dependent human agency instead:
What,	then,	are	the	essential	characteristics	of	true	individualism?	The	first	
thing that should be said is that it is primarily a theory of society, an attempt 
to understand the forces which determine the social life of man, and only in 
the second instance a set of political maxims derived from this view of 
society.	This	 fact	 should	 by	 itself	 be	 sufficient	 to	 refute	 the	 silliest	 of	 the	
common misunderstandings: the belief that individualism postulates (or 
bases its arguments on the assumption of ) the existence of isolated or self- 
contained individuals, instead of starting from men whose whole nature and 
character is determined by their existence in society.
(1946: 6)15
Hayek’s discussion of eighteenth- century conceptions of sympathy emphasizes 
that sympathy plays a role in how individuals come to understand the world 
around them. We quote at some length from his 1963 British Academy lecture. 
Here, Hayek explains how something like Smith’s imaginative projection allows 
us to classify, to connect activities as “wholes,” to say that some of my actions 
and some of your actions are the same thing, they have the same name, they are 
elements of a class:
We have yet to consider more closely the role which the perception of the 
meaning	of	other	people’s	actions	must	play	in	the	scientific	explanation	of	
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the interaction of men. The problem which arises here is known in the dis-
cussion of the methodology of the social sciences as that of Verstehen 
(understanding). We have seen that this understanding of the meaning of 
actions is the same kind as the understanding of communications (i.e., 
actions intended to be understood). It includes what the eighteenth- century 
authors described as sympathy and what has more recently been discussed 
under the heading of “empathy” (Einhühlung). Since we shall be concerned 
chiefly	with	 the	uses	of	 these	perceptions	as	data	 for	 the	 theoretical	social	
sciences, we shall concentrate on what is sometimes called rational under-
standing (or rational reconstruction), that is, on the instances where we 
recognize that the persons in whose actions we are interested base their 
decisions on the meaning of what they perceive. The theoretical social sci-
ences	 do	 not	 treat	 all	 of	 a	 person’s	 actions	 as	 an	 unspecifiable	 and	 unex-
plainable whole but, in their efforts to account for the unintended 
consequences of individual actions, endeavour to reconstruct the indi-
vidual’s reasoning from the data which to him are provided by the recogni-
tion of the actions of others as meaningful wholes.
(1963: 58–9)
The ability to classify offers a foundational account of how we understand unar-
ticulated rules: “We have seen that our capacity to recognize action as following 
rules and having meaning rests on ourselves already being equipped with these 
rules” (1963: 59). In the years before he published The Sensory Order, Hayek 
considered	 the	 classification	 of	 others’	 actions	 based	 on	 a	 type	 of	 projection,	
what “we know solely from knowledge of our mind.” In the “great majority of 
instances,” reasoning from such “analogies” is accurate:
If we consider for a moment the simplest kinds of actions where this 
problem arises, it becomes, of course rapidly obvious that, in discussing 
what we regard as other people’s conscious actions, we invariably interpret 
their action on the analogy of our own mind: that is, that we group their 
actions, and the objects of their actions, into classes or categories which we 
know solely from the knowledge of our mind. We assume that the idea of a 
purpose or a tool, a weapon or food, is common to them with us.
(1943: 63)
If	I	see	for	the	first	time	a	big	boulder	or	an	avalanche	coming	down	the	side	
of a mountain toward a man and see him run for his life, I know the meaning 
of this action because I know what I would or might have done in similar 
circumstances.
 There can be no doubt that we all constantly act on the assumption that 
we can in this way interpret other people’s actions on the analogy of our 
mind and that in the great majority of instances this procedure works. The 
trouble is that we can never be sure.
(1943: 64)
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Such is the nature of “anthropomorphic explanations” for Hayek, who wonders 
whether they constitute science, or not (1943: 65). Since economics is mathemati-
cally certain, Hayek concludes that they have no place in the pure logic of choice.16
Projection at great distance
Projection also enters into Hayek’s account of how individuals make the trans-
ition from small to larger groups. In this transition, projections create the key 
difficulty	of	the	modern	world.	Hayek	argues	that	people	project	from	what	they	
know,	their	experience	with	organizations	characterized	by	a	unified	goal,	to	that	
which they do not know, societies without a goal. In so doing, they are tempted 
by totalitarianism. To this we now turn.
 The foundation for the attack on social justice in the second volume of Law, 
Legislation and Liberty is laid in the 61 numbered, tightly argued paragraphs of 
Hayek’s 1966 address to the Mont Pèlerin Society. In this essay Hayek sets out 
the difference between an organization – a collective with a coherent set of goals 
(preference ordering) – and an order – a collective without this coherence of 
goals. We are tempted by totalitarianism, in Hayek’s account, when we attempt 
to turn an order into an organization.
	 The	 first	 two	 paragraphs	 of	 the	 address	 review	 Hayek’s	 1946	 distinction	
between British and Continental liberalism. The third paragraph distinguishes 
liberalism	 from	 democracy.	Hayek’s	 terminology	 sets	 liberalism	 definitionally	
opposed	to	 totalitarianism	and	democracy	definitionally	opposed	to	authoritari-
anism. The possibility of democratic totalitarianism and authoritarian liberalism 
are empirical issues (1966: 161). Those who attended the Mont Pèlerin Society 
in 1966 would not need to be told that totalitarianism is described in Road to 
Serfdom as the state of society in which only one hierarchy of goals, preference 
ordering, is allowed.17
 Paragraphs 6–13 discuss the relationship between liberalism and a spontane-
ous order. A spontaneous order emerges out of decisions made by individuals 
without common goals. As such, it serves as a natural environment for liberal-
ism. Hayek next confronts the confusion between an “order” and an “organiza-
tion.” While the order is characterized by reciprocity, it differs from the 
organization precisely because it lacks coherence, a single aim:
15. An economy in the strict sense of the word in which we can call a house-
hold,	 a	 farm,	an	enterprise	or	 even	 the	financial	 administration	of	govern-
ment an economy, is indeed an organization . . . in the service of a unitary 
order of purposes. It rests on a system of coherent decisions in which a 
single view of the relative importance of the different competing purposes 
determines the uses to be made of the different resources.
(1966: 164)
16. The spontaneous order of the market resulting from the interaction of 
many such economies is something so fundamentally different from an 
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economy proper that it must be regarded as a great misfortune that it has 
ever been called by the same name. . . . I propose that we call this 
spontaneous order of the market a catallaxy in analogy to the term 
“catallactics”, . . .
(1966: 164)
17. The chief point about a catallaxy is that, as a spontaneous order, its 
orderliness does not rest on its orientation on a single hierarchy of ends, and 
that, therefore, it will not secure that for it as a whole the more important 
comes before the less important.
(1966: 164)
The outcome in a spontaneous order cannot, strictly speaking, be described as 
“just” since this would required a single (unanimously agreed- upon) hierarchy of 
ends. But this is not how people see things. They project what they know onto 
what they do not know. What they know is coherent, the single hierarchy of ends 
in the organization, so they imagine that what they do not know, the order, 
should also be characterized by a single set of preferences. They impose the 
coherence of what they know on what do not know: “37. That the concept of 
justice is nevertheless so commonly and readily applied to the distribution of 
incomes is entirely the effect of an erroneous anthropomorphic interpretation of 
society as an organization rather than as a spontaneous order” (1966: 171). From 
this follows the temptation to totalitarianism: “38. All endeavours to secure a 
‘just’ distribution must thus be directed towards turning the spontaneous order of 
the market into an organization or, in other words, into a totalitarian order” 
(1966: 171).
 Let us reformulate Hayek’s argument in terms of the Arrow impossibility 
literature. The question Hayek is asking is, what condition guarantees that social 
decision procedures are transitive? The answer he is offering is dictatorship: 
where one agent’s preferences are the only ones that count. This is what Hayek 
calls totalitarianism.
 So, to combine the terminology from both Arrow and Hayek, society is faced 
with a trade- off between coherence and liberal democracy. Which will prevail? 
The formal properties of axiomatic systems give no guidance. Hayek’s 1949 
“Intellectuals and Socialism” argued that intellectuals, more than experts or the 
public, were most tempted by totalitarianism. The intellectuals’ desire for coher-
ence was at the root of this temptation.18 Hayek leaves unexplained the question 
of why intellectuals are more concerned with coherence relative to truth than 
experts or ordinary people – the other ideal types in his 1949 story. Perhaps 
Adam Smith’s connection between affection and habitual sympathy provides an 
answer. Those who are habituated to coherence, who spend the most time in 
coherent systems of thought will, other things being equal, be more likely to 
think social coherence worth the cost. Hayek’s claim might be correct but for an 
economic	account,	we	would	require	a	specification	of	the	goals	and	constraints	
of intellectual life. This Hayek does not provide.
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The tyranny of the minority
Hayek argues that there is a strong tendency for a well organized group to 
exploit a less organized group. Although people within small groups are con-
nected by bonds of sympathy and reciprocity, the groups themselves are con-
nected by neither personal ties nor considerations of reciprocity. Hayek’s 
technical criticism of interest- group democracy is sketched in 1960 in the 
context of corporate voting rights, a work that is apparently unknown even to 
scholars who have recently begun to explore the very same corporate pyramids 
that troubled Hayek.19 Since the problem of corporate pyramids highlights the 
importance of Hayek’s early concern, it provides a useful case to work out the 
logic of his argument. This also an instance of Hayek’s account of small- group 
action which does not have biological roots.
 In Hayek’s account, when corporate pyramids exist, the controlling stock-
holders	 in	 one	 company	 can	 run	 other	 corporation(s)	 for	 their	 benefit,	 leaving	
shareholders in the other corporation(s) with poor options:
where the shares of one corporation are owned by another corporation, . . . 
nobody seriously questions that any control thus exercised by the second 
corporation	 over	 the	 first	 can	 legitimately	 be	 employed	 to	 increase	 the	
profits	 of	 the	 second.	 In	 such	 a	 situation	 it	 is	 clearly	 possible,	 and	 not	
unlikely,	that	the	control	over	the	policy	of	the	first	corporation	will	be	used	
to channel the gains from its operations to the	 second,	 and	 that	 the	 first	
would be run, not in the interest of all its stockholders but only in the inter-
est of the controlling majority. When the other stockholders discover this it 
will be too late for them to apply any remedy. The only possibility they will 
have is to sell out – which may be just what the corporate stockholder 
wants.
(1960: 309)
How did this come about? An evolutionary failure? So it seems. The lack of 
deliberation and awareness created the failure:
I must admit that I have never quite understood the rationale or	justification	
of allowing corporations to have voting rights in other corporations of which 
they own shares. So far as I can discover, this was never deliberately 
decided upon in full awareness of all its applications, but came about simply 
as a result of the conception that, if legal personality was conferred upon the 
corporation, it was natural to confer upon it all powers which natural 
persons possessed. But this seems to me by no means a natural or obvious 
consequence. On the contrary, it turns the institution of property into some-
thing quite different from what it is normally supposed to be. The corpora-
tion thereby becomes, instead of an association of partners with a common 
interest,	an	association	of	groups	whose	interests	may	be	in	strong	conflict;	
and the possibility that a group which directly owns assets amounting only 
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to a small fraction of those of the corporation, may, through a pyramiding of 
holdings, acquire assets amounting to a multiple of what they own 
themselves.
(1960: 309)
The correction is to take away the connected corporation’s right to vote:
There seems to me to exist no reason why a corporation should not be 
allowed to own stock of another corporation purely as an investment. But it 
also seems to me that such a stock, so long as it is owned by another corpo-
ration, should cease to confer a right to vote.
(1960: 309)
So, corporate pyramiding turns governance from a matter of individuals with 
common	interests	to	groups	with	conflicting	interests.	Hayek’s	cure	is	to	abolish	
the link between investment and corporate democracy – the “one share one vote” 
principle	fails	to	reflect	the	interest	of	the	majority	of	assets,	so	Hayek	proposes	
a change in the voting rules.
 All of this, majorities controlling majorities resulting in the minority extortion 
of majorities, evolutionary failure and drastic revision of the right to vote, is to 
be found in Law, Legislation and Liberty. Here, Hayek makes the case that 
majority rule in the larger world has become something akin to the world of 
corporate pyramids, in which a group which is large enough to control interest 
groups	 extract	 transfers	 from	 the	 majority	 itself.	 Indeed,	 here	 we	 find	 Hayek	
defending the Athenian practice of election by lot!20 It is in the context of the 
tyranny of the minority that Hayek offered such drastic reforms.21 “Progress” has 
been reversed and Hayek worries about the dictator who will save society from 
themselves:
What I have been trying to sketch in these volumes (and the separate study 
of the role of money in a free society) has been a guide out of the process of 
degeneration of the existing form of government, and to construct an intel-
lectual emergency equipment which will be available when we have no 
choice	 but	 to	 replace	 the	 tottering	 structure	 by	 some	 better	 edifice	 rather	
than resort in despair to some sort of dictatorial regime.
(1979: 152)
Hayek’s despair is such that he concludes there is no path by means of a sponta-
neous order to take us out of the disorder. Evolution has failed.22 To solve this 
evolutionary failure, we need government and government requires purpose.
Factions and competition
Projection in the small, in our local environment, works far more smoothly in 
Hayek’s account than projection in the large.23 The difference between action in 
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the small and in the large is central to Hayek’s discussion of the information 
aggregation properties of markets which culminated in the 1945 “Use of Know-
ledge in Society.” Individuals with local knowledge act in such a way that prices 
reflect	the	aggregation	of	local	information.	To	preserve	these	information	aggre-
gation properties, individuals need to “submit” to prices and the price system.24
 Hayek’s argument about projection from the local organization to the social 
order depends, it seems, on the implicit assumption that there is only one local 
organization	(or,	if	there	are	many,	they	are	sufficiently	similar	in	preferences).	
But what if there are many? Hayek’s important concern about one faction 
exploiting the larger society is a general version of the problem of religious fac-
tions which Adam Smith encountered but did not solve in Theory of Moral Sen-
timents. In Wealth of Nations, Smith offered a possible solution to the problem 
(Levy and Peart 2009). What is important for the present argument is just how 
critical it is in Smith’s proposal that a person belongs not just to one but to many 
organizations.
 The consequence of competition in religion is to change the social distance. 
Hierarchy in a sect is replaced by equality across sects. We no longer have a 
world of leaders and followers, we have equals agreeing to disagree to avoid 
loneliness (Levy and Peart 2008a):
The teachers of each sect, seeing themselves surrounded on all sides with 
more adversaries than friends, would be obliged to learn that candour and 
moderation which is so seldom to be found among the teachers of those great 
sects whose tenets, being supported by the civil magistrate, are held in venera-
tion by almost all the inhabitants of extensive kingdoms and empires, and who 
therefore see nothing round them but followers, disciples, and humble admir-
ers.	The	teachers	of	each	little	sect,	finding	themselves	almost	alone,	would	be	
obliged to respect those of almost every other sect, and the concessions which 
they	would	mutually	 find	 it	 both	 convenient	 and	 agreeable	 to	make	 to	 one	
another, might in time probably reduce the doctrine of the greater part of them 
to that pure and rational religion, free from every mixture of absurdity, impos-
ture, or fanaticism, such as wise men have in all ages of the world wished to 
see established; but such as positive law has perhaps never yet established, 
and probably never will establish, in any country: because, with regard to reli-
gion, positive law always has been, and probably always will be, more or less 
influenced	by	popular	superstition	and	enthusiasm.
(Smith 1776: v.i.197)
It is important to notice Smith has implicitly appealed here to a notion of over-
lapping organizations.
Conclusion: how many organizations are in a person’s life?
In his Nobel Lecture discussed at the outset, Vernon Smith notes that genera-
tions of economists have ignored Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments. 
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Indeed, the incoherence of Wealth of Nations and Theory of Moral Sentiments is 
known as Das Adam Smith Problem. Because Smith’s proposed solution to the 
problem of religious factions is precisely in the intersection of these two books 
(Levy 1978; Levy and Peart 2008a), it seems to have been overlooked by even 
the most careful scholars.
 Smith’s solution is important for Hayek’s argument because in Smith’s 
account competition ensures that religious groups become populated by people 
who belong to overlapping organizations. Perhaps a family will be co- 
religionists, but there is no reason to believe that the people with whom they 
work will belong to the same sect. In this society of competitive religions, a per-
son’s daily life weaves through different organizations, each of which may well 
have a coherent goal. But the goals will differ. Which goal is projected to the 
social order? Toleration of diversity is a plausible equilibrium if only because 
Adam Smith said so and because the experience of American religious toleration 
is consistent with this teaching.
 Competitive discussion and toleration of diversity are at the heart of John 
Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, in which adherents to each set of beliefs will present 
their goals. It seems to be the case that, for Hayek, an individual can be a 
member of only one organization. Whether membership in diverse organizations 
will turn an organization into an order remains an open question.
Notes
 1 Smith (2003: 466). Smith’s paper opens with a quotation from David Hume and then 
from Hayek on the two worlds in which people function.
“we must constantly adjust our lives, our thoughts and our emotions, in order to live 
simultaneously within different kinds of orders according to different rules. If we 
were	to	apply	the	unmodified,	uncurbed	rules	(of	caring	intervention	to	do	visible	
‘good’) of the . . . small band or troop, or . . . our families . . . to the (extended order of 
cooperation through markets), as our instincts and sentimental yearnings often make 
us wish to do, we would destroy it. Yet if we were to always apply the (competitive) 
rules of the extended order to our more intimate groupings, we would crush them” 
(Friedrich A. Hayek, 1988: 18; italics are his, parenthetical reductions are mine).
(Smith 2003: 465)
 Smith’s quotation omits the words “micro- cosmos” and “macro- cosmos” (Hayek 
1988: 18), which are signatures of the Stoic tradition. In the ancient texts, “micro- 
cosmos”	defined	a	person,	as	opposed	to	“the	small	band	or	troop,	or	of,	say,	our	fam-
ilies” (Hayek 1988: 18). The movement from the individual to the small group is 
important for this argument discussed below.
 2 Referring to the political consequences of collectivism, Hayek writes: “In short, they 
are totalitarian in the true sense of this new word which we have adopted to describe 
the unexpected but nevertheless inseparable manifestations of what in theory we call 
collectivism” (1944: 59). The Oxford English Dictionary	 gives	 the	 first	 usage	 of	
“totalitarianism” in 1926 in the context of Italian fascism. Ezra Pound is quoted from 
1937. Hayek knew of Pound and writes this about John Milton: “It is, perhaps, signi-
ficant	 that	 our	 generation	 has	 seen	 a	 host	 of	 American	 and	 English	 detractors	 of	
Milton	–	and	that	the	first	of	them,	Mr.	Ezra	Pound,	was	during	this	war	broadcasting	
from Italy!” (Hayek 1944: 220).
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 3 The various kinds of collectivism, communism, fascism, etc., differ between 
themselves in the nature of the goal towards which they want to direct the efforts 
of society. But they all differ from liberalism and individualism in wanting to 
organise the whole of society and all its resources for this unitary end, and in 
refusing to recognise autonomous spheres in which the ends of the individuals are 
supreme. In short, they are totalitarian.
(Hayek 1944: 60)
Hayek argues against this and concludes the paragraph: “It presupposes, in short, the 
existence of a complete ethical code in which all the different human values are allot-
ted their due place.” He continues in the next paragraph: “The conception of a com-
plete ethical code is unfamiliar and it requires some effort of imagination to see what 
it involves. We are not in the habit of thinking of moral codes as more or less 
complete.”
 4 The connection between Hayek’s argument and Arrow’s impossibility theorem was 
seen earlier by Boettke and Leeson (2002) and reported as part of seminar commen-
tary by Caldwell (2007: 30). Neither lays out Hayek’s argument that this demand for 
coherence comes from a projection from a natural group with unitary goals to an 
order.
 5 Buchanan and Yoon (2006) discuss how unsettling the Arrow–Black result was. 
Buchanan (1954) stands out in retrospect as uniquely undisturbed by social incoher-
ence. Buchanan and Yoon (2006) offer a solution to the Arrow impossibility theorem 
by something akin to a rational expectations move: if Arrow’s agents know what 
Arrow knows, then their voting behavior may change.
 6 In Road to Serfdom the unitary group was explained by primitive rules and taboos.
From the primitive man, who was bound by an elaborate ritual in almost every 
one of his daily activities, who was limited by innumerable taboos, and who could 
scarce conceive of doing things in a way different from his fellows, morals have 
more and more tended to be merely limits.
(Hayek 1944: 101)
In his important 1966 “Principles of a Liberal Social Order,” the small group is 
“tribal” (Hayek 1966: 168).
 7 The disrepute into which sympathy fell can be gauged by the simple fact that “occult” 
is Latin for hidden. Indeed, the connection between sympathy and magic is a com-
monplace among specialists (Levy and Peart 2008a).
 8 Hayek (1963: 46–7):
The	main	difficulty	which	has	to	be	overcome	in	accounting	for	these	phenomena	
is most clearly seen in connection with the phenomenon of imitation. The atten-
tion	 paid	 to	 this	 by	 psychologists	 has	 fluctuated	 greatly	 and	 after	 a	 period	 of	
neglect it seems again to have become respectable. The aspect which concerns us 
here probably has not again been stated more clearly since it was pointed out at 
the end of the eighteenth century by Dugald Stewart [Hayek cites Dugald Stewart, 
Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, chapter on “Sympathetic 
Imitation”].
 9 Hayek (1945: 83):
The comparative stability of the aggregates cannot, however, be accounted for – 
as the statisticians occasionally seem to be inclined to do – by the “law of large 
numbers”	or	the	mutual	compensation	of	random	changes.	.	.	.	The	continuous	flow	
of goods and services is maintained by constant deliberate adjustments, by new 
dispositions made every day in the light of circumstances not known the day 
before, by B stepping in at once when A fails to deliver.
52  S. J. Peart and D. M. Levy
Hayek (1964: 29):
Statistics, however, deals with the problem of large numbers essentially by elim-
inating complexity and deliberately treating the individual elements which it 
counts as if they were not systematically connected . . . it deliberately disregards 
the fact that the relative position of the different elements in a structure may 
matter.
The importance of this aspect of Hayek’s argument is emphasized in Khan (2008).
10 One wonders how many in the audience caught the Stoic image of moral obligation?
Each one of us is as it were entirely encompassed by many circles, some smaller, 
others larger, the latter enclosing the former on the basis of their different and 
unequal	dispositions	relative	to	each	other.	The	first	and	closest	circle	is	the	one	
which a person has drawn as though around a centre, his own mind. This circle 
encloses the body and anything taken for the sake of the body. For it is virtually 
the smallest circle, and almost touches the centre itself. Next, the second one 
further removed from the centre . . . contains parents, siblings, wife, and children. 
The third one has in it uncles and aunts, grandparents, nephews, nieces, and 
cousins. The next circle includes the other relatives, and this is followed by the 
circle of local residents, then the circle of fellow- tribesman, next that of fellow- 
citizens, and then in the same way the circle of people from the neighbouring 
towns, and the circle of fellow- countrymen. The outermost and largest circle, 
which encompasses all the rest, is that of the whole human race. Once these have 
been all surveyed, it is the task of a well tempered man, in his proper treatment of 
each group, to draw the circles together somehow towards the centre, and to keep 
zealously transferring those from the enclosing circles into the enclosed ones.
(Hierocles in Long and Sedley 1987: 349)
11 Berg et al. (1995), cited in Smith (2003). A JSTOR search on “Hayek” and “Dick-
haut” turns up only two papers, Smith (1994) and (2003), which discuss the work of 
both authors.
12 Thus, Hayek imagines a machine which puts balls into a receptacle:
any grouping of different balls by the machine which places them in the same 
receptacle will create a class which is based exclusively on the action of the 
machine and not on any similarity which those balls possess apart from the action 
of the machine.
(Hayek 1952: 49)
13 Hayek (1952: 134):
There appears to exist three prima facie differences between such unconscious 
and conscious behavior which we may provisionally describe by saying that in 
conscious behavior a person will, (a) be able to “give an account” of what he is or 
has being doing.
Hayek (1952: 135):
When we say that a person is able to “give an account” of his mental processes we 
mean by this that he is able to communicate them to other people by means of 
“symbols”, that is by actions, which when perceived by other people, will occupy 
in their mental order a position analogous to that which they occupy in his own; 
and which, in consequence, will have for those other persons a meaning similar to 
that which it possesses for him.
14	 Hayek	stresses	the	common	elements	in	Mandeville,	Hume	and	Smith.	The	identifica-
tion	of	Mandeville	and	Smith	was	challenged	by	Harrod	(1946).	The	identification	of	
Mandeville with laissez- faire – in the sense that Adam Smith’s position can be so 
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described – is debated by specialists, Viner (1953) and Rosenberg (1963), with Hayek 
siding with Rosenberg (Hayek 1967a.) Viner’s correspondence with both Rosenberg 
and Hayek is discussed in Irwin (1991).
15 Recall Hayek’s distinction in The Road to Serfdom, discussed above, between “col-
lectivism” as a theory and “totalitarianism” as a norm.
16 A foundational difference between Hayek and classical political economy, as 
explained by Charles Babbage, is that political economy depends upon median expec-
tation (Peart and Levy 2005). An inference that “works” as well as Hayek stipulates 
here would pass the Babbage test.
17 Hayek (1944: 162) quotes Nietzsche as “entirely in the spirit of collectivism”:
A thousand goals have there been so far, for there have been a thousand peoples. 
Only the yoke for the thousand necks is still lacking: the one goal is lacking. 
Humanity still has no goal. But tell me, my brothers, if humanity still lacks a goal 
– is humanity itself not still lacking too? Thus spoke Zarathustra.
(Nietszche 1954: 170)
18 Hayek (1949: 184–5):
It is perhaps the most characteristic feature of the intellectual that he judges new 
ideas	 not	 by	 their	 specific	 merits	 but	 by	 the	 readiness	 which	 they	 fit	 into	 his	
general conceptions, into the picture of the world which he regards as modern or 
advanced.
19 Morck and Steier (2005) cite Constitution of Liberty but none of the authors in the 
conference volume edited by Morck discusses Hayek’s concern or his proposal for 
reform.
20 Hayek (1979: 32):
Democracy, so far as the term is not used simply as a synonym for egalitarianism, 
is increasingly becoming the name for the very process of vote- buying, for placat-
ing and remunerating those special interests which in more naive times were 
described as the “sinister interests.” . . . I believe in fact that we should get a more 
representative sample of the true opinion of the people at large if we picked out by 
drawing	lots	some	five	hundred	mature	adults	and	let	them	for	twenty	years	devote	
themselves to the task of improving the law, guided only by their conscience and 
the desire to be respected, than by the present system of auction.
21 Hayek (1979: xiii):
When the present volume leads up to a proposal of basic alteration of the structure 
of democratic government, which at this time most people will regard as wholly 
impractical, this is meant to provide a sort of intellectual stand- by equipment for 
the time, which may not be far away, when the breakdown of the existing institu-
tions becomes unmistakable and when I hope it may show a way out. It should 
enable us to preserve what is truly valuable in democracy and at the same time 
free us of its objectionable features which most people still accept only because 
the regard them as inevitable.
22 Hayek (1973: 88):
Why grown law requires correction by legislation The fact that all law arising out 
of the endeavour to articulate rules of conduct will of necessity possess some 
desirable properties not necessarily possessed by the commands of a legislator 
does not mean that in other respects such law may not develop in very undesirable 
directions, and that when this happens correction by deliberate legislation may not 
be the only practicable way out. For a variety of reasons the spontaneous process 
of growth may lead into an impasse from which it cannot extricate itself by its 
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own forces or which it will at least not correct quickly enough. The development 
of case- law is in some respects a sort of one- way street: when it has already 
moved a considerable distance in one direction, it often cannot retrace its steps 
when some implications of earlier decisions are seen to be clearly undesirable. 
The fact that law that has evolved in this way has certain desirable properties does 
not prove that it will always be good law or even that some of its rules may not be 
very bad. It therefore does not mean that we can altogether dispense with 
legislation.
 There are several other reasons for this. One is that the process of judicial 
development of law is of necessity gradual and may prove too slow to bring about 
the desirable rapid adaptation of the law to wholly new circumstances. Perhaps 
the	most	important,	however,	is	that	it	is	not	only	difficult	but	also	undesirable	for	
judicial decisions to reverse a development, which has already taken place and is 
then seen to have undesirable consequences or to be downright wrong. The judge 
is not performing his function if he disappoints reasonable expectations created by 
earlier decisions. Although the judge can develop the law by deciding issues 
which are genuinely doubtful, he cannot really alter it, or can do so at most only 
very	 gradually	 where	 a	 rule	 has	 become	 firmly	 established;	 although	 he	 may	
clearly recognize that another rule would be better.
This passage is stressed by Whitman (1998: 48).
23 Hayek (1943: 65–6):
What I mean by a “friendly face” does not depend upon the physical properties of 
different concrete instances, which may conceivably have nothing in common. 
Yet I learn to recognize them as members of the same class – and what makes 
them members of the same class is not any of their physical properties but an 
imputed meaning.
 The importance of this distinction grows as we move outside the familiar sur-
roundings. As long as I move among my own kind of people, it is probably the 
physical properties of a bank note or a revolver from which I conclude they are 
money or a weapon the person is holding. When I see a savage holding cowrie 
shells or a long, thin tube, the physical properties of the thing will probably tell 
me nothing. But the observations which suggest to me that the cowrie shells are 
money to him and the blowpipe a weapon will throw much light on the object – 
much more light than those same observations could possibly give if I were not 
familiar with the conception of money or a weapon. In recognizing the things as 
such,	I	begin	to	understand	the	people’s	behavior.	I	am	able	to	fit	into	a	scheme	of	
actions which “make sense” just because I have come to regard it not as a thing 
with	certain	physical	properties	but	as	the	kind	of	thing	which	fits	into	the	pattern	
of my own purposive action.
24	 Kahn	(2005)	stresses	the	significance	of	Hayek’s	choice	of	word,	“submission.”
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